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Safety function failure probability calculator

Compute the average probability of failure on demand or the failure frequency per hour for 1oo1, 1oo2, 2oo2, 1oo2D and 2oo3 architectures, with the SIL reached.

Safety and securityFree to useHow it worksSourcesWhere it helps

Fills the inputs below with typical figures. Replace any of them with your own.

Architecture and mode

All five are worked out side by side below. This one drives the headline.

Low demand: demanded once a year or less. High demand or continuous: more often.

Sets the architectural limit.

Used to check the mode. Leave 0 if not known.

Failure rates of one channel

From the maker's failure modes, effects and diagnostic analysis, or your field data.

Needed for the safe failure fraction.

Used by the 1oo2D equations only.

Common cause and diagnostics

Typical scoring results run from 1% to 10% or more. Use your own assessment.

Often taken as about half of beta.

Share of failures of the diagnostic circuit itself that are revealed. Editorial default 98%.

Testing, repair and mission

Sets how far the test interval chart runs.

Time to bring the function back after a detected failure.

Time to repair once a failure is found at a proof test or demand.

PFDavg of 1oo2
1.56e-5
SIL 4 band from the probability
Architectural limit
SIL 3
Type B, safe failure fraction 90.0%, fault tolerance 1
SIL reached
SIL 3
Meets the target of SIL 3
Other measure, PFH
3.54e-9 per hour
Only meaningful for high demand or continuous mode
Channel downtime tCE
689.3 h
Dangerous detected share 84.4%, T1 8,760 h
Dangerous rate per channel
4.50e-7 per hour

Check these

  • The architecture limits the SIL to 3, although the probability reaches the SIL 4 band.
PFDavg against proof test interval (log scale)
Line chart of PFDavg (each tick is a probability) against Proof test interval (years), 4 lines: 1oo1, 1oo2, 1oo2D, 2oo3. The same numbers are in the table under the chart.1.00e-51.00e-41.00e-351015Proof test interval (years)PFDavg (each tick is a probability)
  • 1oo1 (solid line, circles)
  • 1oo2 (dashed line, squares)
  • 1oo2D (dotted line, triangles)
  • 2oo3 (dash-dot line, diamonds)
Show the data as a table
PFDavg against proof test interval (log scale)
Proof test interval (years)1oo11oo21oo2D2oo3
0.08332.91e-51.38e-62.10e-61.38e-6
0.258.03e-53.94e-66.02e-63.96e-6
0.51.57e-47.80e-61.19e-57.86e-6
13.10e-41.56e-52.37e-51.58e-5
26.17e-43.12e-54.75e-53.22e-5
39.23e-44.72e-57.15e-54.93e-5
51.54e-37.97e-51.20e-48.57e-5
103.07e-31.65e-42.46e-41.89e-4
154.60e-32.57e-43.78e-43.10e-4
Sensitivity to the common cause factor (log scale)
Line chart of PFDavg (each tick is a probability) against Common cause factor beta (%), beta D keeps its ratio to beta, 3 lines: 1oo2, 1oo2D, 2oo3. The same numbers are in the table under the chart.1.00e-61.00e-505101520Common cause factor beta (%), beta D keeps its ratio to betaPFDavg (each tick is a probability)
  • 1oo2 (solid line, circles)
  • 1oo2D (dashed line, squares)
  • 2oo3 (dotted line, triangles)
Show the data as a table
Sensitivity to the common cause factor (log scale)
Common cause factor beta (%), beta D keeps its ratio to beta1oo21oo2D2oo3
01.29e-78.35e-63.87e-7
13.21e-61.14e-53.47e-6
26.30e-61.45e-56.55e-6
51.56e-52.37e-51.58e-5
103.10e-53.91e-53.12e-5
154.64e-55.44e-54.66e-5
206.18e-56.98e-56.20e-5

Sign in to save your inputs and come back to them later.

Architectures side by side
ArchitectureFault tolerancePFDavgBand from PFDavgPFH (per hour)Band from PFHArchitectural limitSIL reached, low demand
1oo103.10e-4SIL 37.00e-8SIL 3SIL 2SIL 2
1oo211.56e-5SIL 43.54e-9SIL 4SIL 3SIL 3
2oo206.20e-4SIL 31.40e-7SIL 2SIL 2SIL 2
1oo2D12.37e-5SIL 41.87e-8SIL 3SIL 3SIL 3
2oo311.58e-5SIL 43.62e-9SIL 4SIL 3SIL 3
PFDavg against proof test interval, all five architectures
Test interval (years)1oo11oo22oo21oo2D2oo3
0.08332.91e-51.38e-65.83e-52.10e-61.38e-6
0.258.03e-53.94e-61.61e-46.02e-63.96e-6
0.51.57e-47.80e-63.14e-41.19e-57.86e-6
13.10e-41.56e-56.20e-42.37e-51.58e-5
26.17e-43.12e-51.23e-34.75e-53.22e-5
39.23e-44.72e-51.85e-37.15e-54.93e-5
51.54e-37.97e-53.07e-31.20e-48.57e-5
103.07e-31.65e-46.14e-32.46e-41.89e-4
154.60e-32.57e-49.21e-33.78e-43.10e-4
Sensitivity to the common cause factor
Beta (%)PFDavg 1oo2PFDavg 1oo2DPFDavg 2oo3PFH 1oo2PFH 1oo2DPFH 2oo3
01.29e-78.35e-63.87e-74.34e-111.52e-81.30e-10
13.21e-61.14e-53.47e-67.43e-101.59e-88.28e-10
26.30e-61.45e-56.55e-61.44e-91.66e-81.53e-9
51.56e-52.37e-51.58e-53.54e-91.87e-83.62e-9
103.10e-53.91e-53.12e-57.04e-92.22e-87.11e-9
154.64e-55.44e-54.66e-51.05e-82.57e-81.06e-8
206.18e-56.98e-56.20e-51.40e-82.92e-81.41e-8

How it works

A safety function is only as good as the chance that it fails dangerously. For a function that is demanded rarely, that chance is the average probability of failure on demand (PFDavg). For one that is demanded often or runs all the time, it is the failure frequency per hour (PFH). This tool applies the simplified equations of IEC 61508-6 Annex B to five channel architectures side by side, then finds the SIL band each reaches and the limit set by the safe failure fraction and hardware fault tolerance.

  1. Split the dangerous failure rate. Dangerous failures are either detected by diagnostics (lambda DD) or undetected until a proof test or a demand finds them (lambda DU). If you enter the total dangerous rate and a diagnostic coverage DC, the split follows. Safe failures (lambda S) matter only for the safe failure fraction and, for 1oo2D, the detected share of them.lambda DD = DC x lambda D; lambda DU = (1 − DC) x lambda D; SFF = (lambda S + lambda DD) / (lambda S + lambda DD + lambda DU)
  2. Work out the downtimes. An undetected failure sits unseen for half the proof test interval on average, plus the time to repair once found. A detected failure lasts only the time to restore. The channel downtime weights the two by their share of the dangerous rate. For a pair of channels the second failure sees an unseen failure that has lasted a third of the interval.tCE = (lambda DU / lambda D) x (T1 / 2 + MRT) + (lambda DD / lambda D) x MTTR; tGE = (lambda DU / lambda D) x (T1 / 3 + MRT) + (lambda DD / lambda D) x MTTR
  3. Count common cause failures. A share beta of undetected failures, and a share beta D of detected failures, hit every channel at once. They behave like one channel and are added on top of the independent term. The independent rate is what is left after taking the common cause share out.lambda i = (1 − beta D) x lambda DD + (1 − beta) x lambda DU; common cause term = beta D x lambda DD x MTTR + beta x lambda DU x (T1 / 2 + MRT)
  4. Low demand: PFDavg by architecture. One channel fails the function when it fails. Two channels in 2oo2 fail it when either does. In 1oo2 both must fail, so the first failure (either channel) has to be followed by a second during the downtime. In 2oo3 any pair of the three can supply the second failure. 1oo2D adds the effect of detected safe failures and of the diagnostic circuit's own coverage K.1oo1: lambda D x tCE; 2oo2: 2 x lambda D x tCE; 1oo2: 2 x lambda i^2 x tCE x tGE + common cause term; 2oo3: 6 x lambda i^2 x tCE x tGE + common cause term; 1oo2D: 2 x (1 − beta) x lambda DU x ((1 − beta) x lambda DU + (1 − beta D) x lambda DD + lambda SD) x t'CE x t'GE + 2 x (1 − K) x lambda DD x t'CE + beta x lambda DU x (T1 / 2 + MRT), with t'CE = (lambda DU x (T1 / 2 + MRT) + (lambda DD + lambda SD) x MTTR) / (lambda DU + lambda DD + lambda SD) and t'GE = T1 / 3 + MRT
  5. High demand or continuous: PFH by architecture. Here the measure is how often the group reaches a dangerous failure. A first dangerous failure in one channel is only a hazard if the other already hides an undetected one, so the second term is lambda DU times the channel downtime. A detected failure that comes last is assumed to drive the system to its safe state.1oo1: lambda DU; 2oo2: 2 x lambda DU; 1oo2: 2 x lambda i x (1 − beta) x lambda DU x tCE + beta x lambda DU; 2oo3: 6 x lambda i x (1 − beta) x lambda DU x tCE + beta x lambda DU; 1oo2D: 2 x ((1 − beta) x lambda DU + (1 − beta D) x lambda DD + lambda SD) x (1 − beta) x lambda DU x t'CE + 2 x (1 − K) x lambda DD + beta x lambda DU
  6. Find the SIL band. The bands are decades. For low demand, SIL 1 is a PFDavg from 1e-2 up to but not including 1e-1, SIL 2 from 1e-3, SIL 3 from 1e-4, SIL 4 from 1e-5. For high demand, SIL 1 is a PFH from 1e-6 per hour up to but not including 1e-5, SIL 2 from 1e-7, SIL 3 from 1e-8, SIL 4 from 1e-9.SIL from probability = the band that contains PFDavg or PFH
  7. Apply the architectural limit (route 1H). Whatever the arithmetic says, the SIL of a subsystem is capped by its structure. A single channel starts from a base SIL set by the element type and the safe failure fraction: type A gives SIL 1, 2 and 3 for a fraction below 60%, from 60% to below 90%, and 90% or more; type B gives not allowed, 1, 2 and 3 for below 60%, 60% to below 90%, 90% to below 99%, and 99% or more. Every unit of hardware fault tolerance adds one step, to a ceiling of SIL 4. The SIL reached is the lower of the probability band and this limit.SIL reached = min(SIL from probability, base SIL(type, SFF) + HFT, 4)
  8. Check the equations still apply. The simplified equations are first-order. They hold while lambda DU x T1 is small. The tool warns when it passes 0.1 and shows how much the single channel value is overstated.check: lambda DU x T1 < 0.1; one channel exact PFDavg = 1 − (1 − exp(−x)) / x with x = lambda DU x T1

Assumptions

  • Channels in a voted group are identical, with constant failure rates, and failures and repairs are exponentially distributed.
  • The proof test is perfect: it finds every undetected dangerous failure and the equipment is as good as new afterwards.
  • Repair puts the channel back to full working order, and the function is not demanded during repair or restoration.
  • In high demand mode, a detected dangerous failure that occurs last drives the system to its safe state.
  • A single set of failure rates, test intervals and common cause factors describes the whole voted group.

Limits and warnings

  • The result is for one subsystem (sensor, logic solver or final element). For a whole safety function add the average probabilities of its subsystems and take the lowest architectural limit.
  • Imperfect proof tests, partial stroke tests, staggered tests and non-identical channels are not covered. Use a Markov model or a vendor tool for those.
  • Common cause factors here are inputs. The standard also gives a scoring method for estimating them; this tool does not implement it.
  • Route 1H only. Route 2H, which uses field-proven data in place of the safe failure fraction, is not covered, nor are systematic capability and software.
  • The 1oo2D equations are the weakest part of the simplified set: research has shown they do not follow from a fully consistent model. They are included because the standard gives them and tools quote them, so treat the 1oo2D result as indicative.
  • The default failure rates in the presets are editorial examples. Replace them with the maker's FMEDA data or your own field data.

Sources

The methods and default figures rest on these public sources. The wording here is our own; read the source for its full text.

  • IEC 61508-6:2010, Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems, Part 6: Guidelines on the application of IEC 61508-2 and IEC 61508-3, International Electrotechnical Commission, April 2010. Annex B (informative): the simplified equations for PFDavg (clause B.3.2) and for the failure frequency in high demand or continuous mode (clause B.3.3). Cited by name, annex and clause only; the method is written here in our own words.
  • IEC 61508-1:2010 and IEC 61508-2:2010, Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems, International Electrotechnical Commission, April 2010. Part 1: the SIL target failure measures for low demand and high demand or continuous mode. Part 2, clause 7.4.4: architectural constraints, type A and type B elements, and route 1H. Cited by name and clause only.
  • Chapter 8: PFD formulas in IEC 61508 (opens in a new tab), M. A. Lundteigen and M. Rausand, RAMS Group, NTNU (lecture slides, version 0.1), 2011. Explains the equivalent downtimes tCE and tGE, the group failure frequency and the beta factor terms used for 1oo2 and 2oo3.
  • Chapter 8: Calculation of PFH (opens in a new tab), M. Rausand and M. A. Lundteigen, RAMS Group, NTNU (lecture slides, version 0.1), 2011. Explains the high demand equations for 1oo1, 1oo2 and 2oo3 and the assumption about a detected failure occurring last.
  • SIL Calculations: Easy or Difficult? (technical guide, 61508 Association toolbox talk by IMC Teesside) (opens in a new tab), 61508 Association, 7 November 2012. Shows the 1oo1, 1oo2, 2oo2, 2oo3 and 1oo2D equations of the 2000 edition of Part 6 and a worked 1oo1 example (lambda DU of 1e-9, lambda DD of 1e-6, restoration of 8 hours, one year test interval, PFD of 1.24e-5), which the unit test reproduces.

Where it helps

The lifecycle stages this tool serves: 2 stages in 1 lifecycle.

Method notev1Formula, ranges, sources and limits

Computes the average probability of failure on demand and the failure frequency per hour for 1oo1, 1oo2, 2oo2, 1oo2D and 2oo3 channels from the simplified IEC 61508-6 Annex B equations, with the SIL band and the route 1H architectural limit.

Formula

lambda DD = DC x lambda D; lambda DU = (1 − DC) x lambda D; SFF = (lambda S + lambda DD) / (lambda S + lambda DD + lambda DU); tCE = (lambda DU / lambda D) x (T1 / 2 + MRT) + (lambda DD / lambda D) x MTTR; tGE = (lambda DU / lambda D) x (T1 / 3 + MRT) + (lambda DD / lambda D) x MTTR; lambda i = (1 − beta D) x lambda DD + (1 − beta) x lambda DU; common cause term = beta D x lambda DD x MTTR + beta x lambda DU x (T1 / 2 + MRT); 1oo1: lambda D x tCE; 2oo2: 2 x lambda D x tCE; 1oo2: 2 x lambda i^2 x tCE x tGE + common cause term; 2oo3: 6 x lambda i^2 x tCE x tGE + common cause term; 1oo2D: 2 x (1 − beta) x lambda DU x ((1 − beta) x lambda DU + (1 − beta D) x lambda DD + lambda SD) x t'CE x t'GE + 2 x (1 − K) x lambda DD x t'CE + beta x lambda DU x (T1 / 2 + MRT), with t'CE = (lambda DU x (T1 / 2 + MRT) + (lambda DD + lambda SD) x MTTR) / (lambda DU + lambda DD + lambda SD) and t'GE = T1 / 3 + MRT; 1oo1: lambda DU; 2oo2: 2 x lambda DU; 1oo2: 2 x lambda i x (1 − beta) x lambda DU x tCE + beta x lambda DU; 2oo3: 6 x lambda i x (1 − beta) x lambda DU x tCE + beta x lambda DU; 1oo2D: 2 x ((1 − beta) x lambda DU + (1 − beta D) x lambda DD + lambda SD) x (1 − beta) x lambda DU x t'CE + 2 x (1 − K) x lambda DD + beta x lambda DU; SIL from probability = the band that contains PFDavg or PFH; SIL reached = min(SIL from probability, base SIL(type, SFF) + HFT, 4); check: lambda DU x T1 < 0.1; one channel exact PFDavg = 1 − (1 − exp(−x)) / x with x = lambda DU x T1

Inputs
InputUnitRange it holds forComes from
Architecturechoice1oo1, 1oo2, 2oo2, 1oo2D, 2oo3Your figure
Mode of operationchoicelow, highYour figure
Element typechoiceA, BYour figure
Failure rate unitchoicefit, perhourYour figure
Failure rate entrychoicesplit, totalYour figure
Dangerous undetected rate per channelFIT or per hourfrom 0Your figure
Dangerous detected rate per channelFIT or per hourfrom 0Your figure
Total dangerous rate per channelFIT or per hourfrom 0Your figure
Diagnostic coverage%0 to 100Your figure
Safe failure rate per channelFIT or per hourfrom 0Your figure
Share of safe failures detected%0 to 100Your figure
Common cause factor beta%0 to 100Your figure
Common cause factor beta D%0 to 100Your figure
Diagnostic circuit coverage K (1oo2D)%0 to 100Your figure
Unit for the test interval and mission timechoiceyears, hoursYour figure
Proof test intervalyears or hoursfrom 0Your figure
Mean time to restorationhfrom 0Your figure
Mean repair timehfrom 0Your figure
Mission timeyears or hoursfrom 0Your figure
Demands per yearper yearfrom 0Your figure
Target SIL0 to 40 to 4Your figure

Outputs: PFDavg of the chosen architecture (probability); PFH of the chosen architecture (per hour); SIL band from PFDavg (SIL); SIL band from PFH (SIL); Architectural limit (SIL); SIL reached in the chosen mode (SIL); Safe failure fraction (fraction).

Assumptions

  • Channels in a voted group are identical, with constant failure rates, and failures and repairs are exponentially distributed.
  • The proof test is perfect: it finds every undetected dangerous failure and the equipment is as good as new afterwards.
  • Repair puts the channel back to full working order, and the function is not demanded during repair or restoration.
  • In high demand mode, a detected dangerous failure that occurs last drives the system to its safe state.
  • A single set of failure rates, test intervals and common cause factors describes the whole voted group.

Uncertainty: The equations are first-order approximations that hold while the undetected rate times the proof test interval is small; for larger products they overstate the probability. The result is only as good as the failure rates and the common cause factors entered.

Known limits

  • The result is for one subsystem (sensor, logic solver or final element). For a whole safety function add the average probabilities of its subsystems and take the lowest architectural limit.
  • Imperfect proof tests, partial stroke tests, staggered tests and non-identical channels are not covered. Use a Markov model or a vendor tool for those.
  • Common cause factors here are inputs. The standard also gives a scoring method for estimating them; this tool does not implement it.
  • Route 1H only. Route 2H, which uses field-proven data in place of the safe failure fraction, is not covered, nor are systematic capability and software.
  • The 1oo2D equations are the weakest part of the simplified set: research has shown they do not follow from a fully consistent model. They are included because the standard gives them and tools quote them, so treat the 1oo2D result as indicative.
  • The default failure rates in the presets are editorial examples. Replace them with the maker's FMEDA data or your own field data.

Where the method comes from

Follows IEC 61508-6:2010 Annex B, simplified equations (as explained by Lundteigen and Rausand, NTNU, and by the 61508 Association technical guide) (opens in a new tab). The platform's version departs from it as follows.

  • Adds the SIL bands, the route 1H limit and the sweeps to the equations Why: The equations alone do not say which SIL a design reaches or how it changes with the test interval and the common cause factor.
  • Takes the 1oo2D equations from the 2000 edition as quoted in a public guide Why: The 2010 text could not be read here; users should check the 1oo2D terms against their copy of Part 6.

Worked example from the source: Lambda DU 1e-9 per hour, lambda DD 1e-6 per hour, MTTR and MRT 8 h, T1 8,760 h (one channel). Source result: PFD of 1.238e-5, with tCE of 12.3756 h. This model, same inputs: 0.000012.

Reference example, checked by test: Worked 1oo1 example in the 61508 Association technical guide (lambda DU 1e-9 per hour, lambda DD 1e-6 per hour, safe 8e-6 per hour, MTTR and MRT 8 h, T1 8,760 h): tCE 12.3756 h and PFD 1.238e-5. The SIL bands and the limit follow by hand: PFD 1.24e-5 is in the SIL 4 band; the safe failure fraction is 99.99%, so a type B channel is limited to SIL 3. PFDavg of the chosen architecture 0.000012; SIL band from PFDavg 4; Architectural limit 3; SIL reached in the chosen mode 3.

Versions

  • v1 (2026-10-25): First version, built from the tool idea.

All models in the register

Terms on this page

SIL
Testing in which the production source code is compiled for the host PC and run against a simulated plant model, with no target hardware present.
IEC 61508
The generic functional safety standard defining Safety Integrity Levels 1 to 4, the safety lifecycle, and the hardware and systematic capability requirements behind them.
Diagnostic coverage
The percentage of a part's dangerous failure rate that a given safety mechanism detects or controls in time.
Safe state
An operating mode of an item that does not violate its safety goals, entered when a fault is detected.
Subsystem
A group of blocks integrated and verified together to provide a larger function, such as a processor cluster with its caches and interrupt controller or an interface controller with its physical la...
Tier 1
A supplier that sells complete systems or modules directly to a vehicle manufacturer, such as a braking system, ADAS controller or cockpit unit, and carries responsibility for their design, validat...
FMEDA
The quantitative analysis that assigns a failure rate to every hardware part, splits it across failure modes, and credits each safety mechanism with a diagnostic coverage.

The full glossary

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